The Contract with Muslims must not be torn up
Michael Clark
Guardian Comment
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Britain's culture of tolerating radicalism is in the national interest and should not be swept away by the urge to get tough
Friday August 26, 2005
The Guardian
We are in for a tense autumn, whether or not there are more terrorist bombings in Britain. Tony Blair declared that "the rules of the game have changed" and it seems that they have. The limits of traditional British tolerance are being tested, not only by jihadi clerics who preach religious fascism and racial hatred, but also by a government that preaches "common sense" and "enough is enough". More bomb plots, successful or not; more incidents and precautions; more accusations and rebuttals; all threaten to make the next phase in the jihadi campaign more divisive than during the past two months.
The more we learn about the two bomb plots in London, the less they fit any of our previous understandings of terrorism. These two jihadi terrorist cells emerge as typically British: full of anomalies, eccentric in their behaviour, gentlemen-amateurs alternating between ruthless homicide and comical incompetence. Evelyn Waugh would have understood them very well - the rest of us are still struggling.
Longstanding critics of the British approach quietly gloat. French security forces warned that allowing a "Londonistan" to develop was only appeasing international terrorists until it suited them to bomb their safe haven. Many in the US administration have been openly bemused by the levels of tolerance shown to such controversial figures as Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri Mohammed or Abu Qatada.
The "covenant of security" between the British authorities and leaders of Muslim communities was a well-understood compromise. There would be high levels of toleration in exchange for self-policing. Critics argue that this was always a naive arrangement - not only did it fail to prevent bomb attacks, but it may have created a climate that stimulated them. In many eyes, mainstream organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain and the Muslim Association of Britain no longer appear so "mainstream". Their leaders look as if they were given more credence by the government than by parts of their own communities. The "covenant of security" was not just a naive deal, say the critics; it was made with the wrong people. It is time to get tough.
In response, the government wants to look as tough as possible. Legislation will be presented to parliament in the autumn that creates new offences and defines acts more in the French "preparatory to terrorism" category, including "indirectly inciting" and "glorifying" terrorism. Under similar proposals, terrorist suspects may be detained for up to 90 days instead of 14; and the government is attracted to making electronic intercept evidence admissible in court. The home secretary makes clear that he will use his existing powers more assertively to exclude and deport individuals who seem to be authentic jihadis. Both parliament and the courts of appeal can expect to be pretty busy this autumn.
But the "covenant of security" and the British approach to tolerating radicalism is not just an expression of political correctness. It serves some hard-headed national purposes. It recognises that there is not one but several Muslim communities among the 1.5 million Muslims in Britain, all with their own national norms and attitudes to culture and assimilation. Self-policing and a better relationship with the police, working with the grain of different national and religious minorities, is fundamental to preventing our gentleman-amateur suicide bombers from becoming figureheads for a national revolt among Muslim youth.
The covenant approach generally suits the police, who know that their effectiveness is ultimately dependent on the legitimacy officers have at local level. They can run zero-tolerance campaigns on antisocial behaviour or any number of specific issues, but only with the implicit consent of the majority. A light touch in general allows for a heavy hand on occasion; it does not work in reverse.
Not least, the "covenant of security" is favoured by most of the security services - it encourages local communities to join the intelligence effort and allows interesting individuals to be monitored more easily. US authorities were exasperated at the way that Abu Hamza was allowed to preach to a large crowd of radical followers every Friday outside the Finsbury Park mosque. But for a British spook, this kind of weekly photo opportunity is worth its weight in gold, and probably far harder to find with Abu Hamza now in custody, pending extradition to the US.
The covenant approach is showing its imperfections, but it needs to be reworked, not ditched. Local Muslim leaders have to re-engage with some of the disaffected youth in their communities and shake themselves out of denial. US and British foreign policy is not part of a global Zionist conspiracy; nor is opposition to it tantamount to jihadism. Lots of people oppose such policies in effective and democratic ways. But the communities have got to face these questions squarely, instead of using them to construct an identity based on fear and self-pity.
The police have got to develop more intimate relations within some key Muslim communities, exploiting opportunities for more innovative cooperation, particularly in the education sector.
Terrorists try to mangle people in their bombings so that they can mangle ideas in the aftermath. To do that, they need the conscious or unconscious cooperation of the authorities and public opinion. The British idea of tolerating the evil ravings of a very few in order to protect the free speech of the many remains a good one. Addressing the disturbing implications of the July bombings for our society will not be helped very much by eye-catching legal initiatives destined mainly for the appeal courts.
· Michael Clarke@kcl.ac.uk is professor of defence studies at King's College London and editor of Terrorist Attacks in Britain: The Next Phase
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